

### REMARKS

Claims 1, 3-4, 6-8, and 10-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by *Bohannon et al.* (U.S. Patent 6,134,324).

Applicant traverses this rejection on the grounds that this reference is defective in supporting a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §102(b).

The PTO provides in MPEP §2131..."To anticipate a claim, the reference must teach every element of the claim...". Therefore, to sustain this rejection the *Bohannon et al.* patent must contain all of the claimed elements of claims 1 and 8. However, the claimed first and second phases and first and second setup processes are not shown or taught in the *Bohannon et al.* patent. Therefore, the rejection is unsupported by the art and should be withdrawn.

Claims 1 and 8 include:

1. A method of installing software comprising: receiving a storage device; performing a first phase of installing programs onto the storage device; configuring a first setup process to determine at least one directory on the storage device for copying contents of a program; performing a second phase of installing programs onto the storage device; and configuring a second setup process to cause a program to be integrated into an operating system.
8. A system for installing software comprising: a computer system configured to execute a process; and a storage device coupled to the computer system, the storage device including software installed by: performing a first phase of installing programs onto the storage device; configuring a first setup process to determine at least one directory on the storage device for copying contents of a program; performing a second

phase of installing programs onto the storage device; and configuring a second setup process to cause a program to be integrated into an operating system.

A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art reference." *Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California*, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051, contained in the ...claim." *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

Therefore, claims 1 and 8 and their respective independent claims are not anticipated by *Bohannon et al.*

Claims 2, 5 and 9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over *Bohannon et al.* in view of the applicant's choice of design of selecting a specific type of file to be loaded, as taught by *Crosswy et al.* (U.S. Patent 5,325,532).

Applicants traverse this rejection on the grounds that these references are defective in establishing a *prima facie* case of obviousness for the reasons set forth above and for further reasons set forth below.

As the PTO recognizes in MPEP §2142:

...The Examiner bears the initial burden of factually supporting any *prima facie* conclusion of obviousness. If the Examiner does not produce a *prima facie* case, the Applicant is under no obligation to submit evidence of nonobviousness.....the Examiner must step backward in time and into the shoes worn by the hypothetical 'person of ordinary skill in the art' when the invention was unknown and just before it was made....The Examiner must put aside knowledge of the Applicant's disclosure, refrain from using hindsight, and consider the subject matter claimed 'as a whole.'"

Therefore, there is simply no basis in the art for combining the references to support a 35 U.S.C. §103 rejection because neither the *Bohannon et al.* reference nor

the *Crosswy et al.* reference teaches or even suggests the desirability of the combination. Moreover, neither patent provides any incentive or motivation supporting the desirability of the combination. These references do not achieve a combined teaching or suggestion of the first and second installation phases and the first and second setup processes as claimed.

The MPEP §2143.01 provides:

The mere fact that references can be combined or modified does not render the resultant combination obvious unless the prior art also suggests the desirability of the combination. *In re Mills*, 916 F.2d 680, 16 USPQ2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

Therefore, the Examiner's combination arises solely from hindsight based on the invention without any showing of suggestion, incentive or motivation in either reference for the combination.

Thus, the Examiner's burden of factually supporting a *prima facie* case of obviousness has clearly not been met.

The Federal Circuit has, on many occasions, held that there was no basis for combining references to support a 35 U.S.C. §103 rejection. For example, in *In re Geiger*, the court stated in holding that the PTO "failed to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness":

Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention, absent some teaching, suggestion or incentive supporting the combination. *ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Monteffore Hospital*, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

The Federal Circuit has also repeatedly warned against using the Applicant's disclosure as a blueprint to reconstruct the claimed invention out of isolated teachings in the prior art. See *e.g.*, *Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products*, 840 F.2d 902, 907, 5 USPQ2d 1798, 1792 (Fed. Cir. 1989).


More recently, the Federal Circuit found motivation absent in *In re Rouffet*, 149 F.3d 1350, 47 USPQ2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In this case, the court concluded that the board had "reversibly erred in determining that one of [ordinary] skill in the art would have been motivated to combine these references in a manner that rendered the claimed invention [to have been] obvious." The court noted that to "prevent the use of hindsight based on the invention to defeat patentability of the invention, this court requires the Examiner to show a motivation to combine the references that create the case of obviousness." The court further noted that there were three possible sources for such motivation, namely "(1) the nature of the problem to be solved; (2) the teachings of the prior art; and (3) the knowledge of persons of ordinary skill in the art." Here, according to the court, the board had relied simply upon "the high level of skill in the art to provide the necessary motivation," without explaining what specific understanding or technological principle within the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art would have suggested the combination. Notably, the court wrote: "If such a rote invocation could suffice to supply a motivation to combine, the more sophisticated scientific fields would rarely, if ever, experience a patentable technical advance."

Therefore, independent claims 1 and 8 and the claims dependent therefrom are submitted to be allowable.

In view of the above, it is respectfully submitted that claims 1-13 are in condition for allowance. Accordingly, an early Notice of Allowance is courteously solicited.

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
Respectfully submitted,



James R. Bell  
Registration No. 26,528

Dated: 8-21-03  
HAYNES AND BOONE, L.L.P.  
901 Main Street, Suite 3100  
Dallas, Texas 75202-3789  
Telephone: 512/867-8407  
Facsimile: 512/867-8470

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